security: audit Command call sites; confirm no argument injection
Closes #18 All six Command::new call sites audited: - bitwarden.rs (sh -c): shell string is a hardcoded literal; no user data. - bitwarden.rs (bw unlock): all args hardcoded. - bitwarden.rs (bw get): item_name and session passed as discrete .args() elements; no shell. - nothooks/runner.rs (nu/sh/etc): interp and script path passed as discrete args; no shell. - notstrap/repo.rs (git clone): url and dest passed as discrete .arg() calls; no shell. - notfiles/tests/integration.rs: test harness with hardcoded args only. Added SAFETY comments on the three sites that handle user-controlled config values.
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@@ -89,6 +89,10 @@ impl HookRunner {
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Ok(i) => i,
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Err(msg) => return HookResult::Failed(msg),
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};
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// SAFETY: `interp` is derived from the file extension or an explicit `interpreter` field
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// in HookSpec (both come from config, not untrusted shell input). `spec.script` is a
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// filesystem path from config. Both are passed as discrete args with no shell involved,
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// so argument injection is not possible.
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let result = Command::new(&interp).arg(&spec.script).status();
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match result {
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@@ -83,6 +83,9 @@ impl BitwardenSource {
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session
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};
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// SAFETY: `item_name` and `session` are user-controlled values (config item name and
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// BW_SESSION env var / bw-unlock stdout), but are passed as discrete `.args()` elements,
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// not interpolated into a shell string. No shell is involved, so injection is not possible.
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let output = Command::new("bw")
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.args(["get", "notes", &self.item_name, "--session", &session])
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.output()
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@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ pub fn clone_if_missing(url: &str, dest: &Path) -> Result<bool> {
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if dest.exists() {
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return Ok(false);
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}
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// SAFETY: `url` comes from the notstrap.toml config and `dest` is a `Path` derived from
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// the resolved dotfiles directory. Both are passed as discrete `.arg()` calls with no
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// shell involved, so argument injection is not possible.
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let status = Command::new("git")
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.arg("clone")
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.arg(url)
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